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Prenatal Diagnosis and Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis: Legal and Ethical Issues
By: Roxanne Mykitiuk, Stephanie Turnham and Mireille Lacroix
in Neil F. Sharpe and Ronald F. Carter (eds.) Genetic Testing: Care, Consent and
Liability. Hoboken, New Jersey: JohnWiley and Sons Inc. (2006) 189-218.

Introduction

Prenatal diagnosis of genetic disorders and foetal anomalies has expanded significantly.
Hundreds of conditions can be diagnosed through DNA analysis of foetal cells and
ultrasound and maternal serum biochemical screening. The purpose of prenatal diagnosis
is to rule out the presence in the foetus of a particular medical condition for which the
pregnancy is at an increased risk. This information is provided to the individual or couple
to assist in the decision-making process regarding the possible options including:
carrying the pregnancy to term, preparing for a difficult delivery, preparing for the birth
of a child with genetic anomalies and for special newborn care, or terminating the
pregnancy. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) involves the creation of embryos
outside the body and their subsequent biopsy, in order to test for a genetic disorder. The
stated advantage of PGD over prenatal diagnosis or testing is that the genetic diagnosis
takes place at a much earlier stage. As a pregnancy has not been established, couples or
individuals will not have to consider abortion, which is likely to be a much more stressful
and difficult decision than the disposal of affected embryos in their earliest stage of
development. It is expected that the range of conditions for which PGD is available will
expand as the genes implicated are identified. Prenatal genetic testing and
preimplantation diagnosis raise a number of ethical and legal issues that will be discussed
below following a brief description of PND and PGD techniques.
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PND & PGD techniques

Prenatal testing includes prenatal screening, prenatal diagnosis and preimplantation
genetic diagnosis. Screening methods such as determination of maternal age, maternal
serum screening and ultrasound are used to identify women who are at increased risk of
having a child with a chromosomal anomaly or a congenital anomaly. If a screening test
yields an abnormal result, it can be followed by prenatal diagnosis in order to establish
whether the foetus does carry a specific genetic mutation or chromosomal anomaly.

Prenatal diagnosis

Techniques currently used for prenatal diagnosis include:
•

amniocentesis,

•

chorionic villus sampling (CVS) and

•

cordocentesis.

Amniocentesis is performed after 14 weeks of gestational age (usually between 15 and 17
weeks) in order to determine foetal karyotype and to detect the presence of molecular and
biochemical abnormalities. A needle is inserted into the amniotic sac of a pregnant
woman while ultrasound imaging is used to verify the position of the foetus and the
location of the placenta. A small quantity of amniotic fluid is aspirated, and its level of
alpha-fetoprotein is measured. The foetal cells contained in the amniotic fluid are also
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cultured and analysed using karyotyping, molecular diagnosis, biochemical assays or
direct fluorescent in situ hybridisation. Results are highly reliable, but are available one
to three weeks after the amniocentesis, at 17 to 20 weeks of gestation. This is regarded by
some as the most important drawback of amniocentesis: at this stage, termination of
pregnancy – currently the only option to prevent the birth of an affected child – entails a
greater physical and emotional risk to the woman than a first trimester abortion and is
difficult to obtain in many regions of Canada and the United States [Childbirth by
Choice, 2003; Henshaw & Finer, 2003]. However, the risks of the procedure itself are
low. The risk of miscarriage due to amniocentesis is 0.5 to one percent, while the risk of
infection and foetal injury are rare. Minor complications such as leakage of amniotic
fluid, and bleeding occur in one to five percent of cases, but usually resolve themselves
[Chodirker et al., 2001b; Jorde et al., 2003].

CVS is performed earlier, between ten weeks and eleven weeks six days of gestational
age. It involves the collection of chorionic tissue either through a transcervical or
transabdominal technique, and its subsequent analysis. The cells obtained can be
analysed directly or cultured as in amniocentesis. Like amniocentesis, CVS is highly
accurate, but it has the advantage of yielding earlier results. The risk of spontaneous
pregnancy loss is slightly higher at one to two percent over baseline risk for
transabdominal tissue collection and three to six percent with the transcervical technique.
CVS may also entail a one in 3000 risk of facial or limb anomaly due to vascular
disruption. In addition, diagnosis may be compromised if the sample has been
contaminated with maternal tissue or if there is a discrepancy between the chromosomes

4
in the foetal tissue and the chorionic tissue. These difficulties can however be easily
circumvented [Chodirker et al., 2001b; Jorde et al., 2003].

Cordocentesis is generally performed after 16 weeks of gestation when a rapid diagnosis
is required in cases where ultrasound has revealed congenital malformations or growth
retardation, to clarify suspected chromosome mosaicism, or to detect viral infections,
haematological diseases, inborn errors of metabolism and maternal or foetal platelet
disorders. It involves the insertion of a needle into the umbilical cord vessel with
ultrasound guidance and the withdrawal of foetal blood. Cordocentesis has the advantage
of allowing direct access to the foetus, but entails a slightly higher risk of pregnancy loss,
as well as a five to ten percent risk of foetal distress [Chodirker et al., 2001b; Jorde et al.,
2003; Simpson and Elias, 2003].

In addition to these techniques, prenatal genetic diagnosis can be conducted through
foetal tissue sampling. As is the case in amniocentesis and cordocentesis, the procedure is
performed under ultrasound guidance. A needle is inserted and foetal tissue such as skin,
liver or foetal urinary tract is collected for analysis. The risks and complications are
similar to those linked to cordocentesis. However, the procedure is not commonly
practiced. Similarly, the isolation of foetal cells from maternal blood is currently being
studied as a technique of prenatal diagnosis. It would have the advantage of noninvasiveness (and therefore extremely low risk) and of being conducted early in the first
trimester. It is not yet available in clinical practice [Chodirker et al., 2001b; Health
Canada, 2002; Jorde et al. 2003; Shinya et al., 2004].
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Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis

In contrast with prenatal diagnosis, preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is conducted
before a woman becomes clinically pregnant. It is therefore an attractive option for
couples at increased risk of having a child with a genetic condition who wish to avoid the
possible termination of an affected pregnancy or who oppose abortion for religious or
moral reasons [Simpson and Elias, 2003; Sermon et al., 2004; Verlinsky et al., 2004].
Though it has moved from the research setting to clinical application in recent years,
PGD is not widely available, and it is considerably more complex (and costly) than
traditional PND methods [Health Canada, 2002; Simpson and Elias, 2003; Verlinsky et
al., 2003]. It involves the creation of embryos through in vitro fertilisation and the
analysis of only one or a few cells from these embryos (or, in some cases, from the
ovum) in order to establish a genetic diagnosis.

Cells can be obtained through biopsy at three different stages: prior to fertilisation
(biopsy of polar bodies), from blastomeres, and from blastocysts. For polar-body biopsy,
an incision is made in the zona pellucida in order to draw the polar body out of the egg.
Analysis of the polar body enables scientists to draw conclusions about the genotype of
the oocyte. The utility of this technique is limited to testing for aneuploidy or to cases in
which risk is known to originate from the mother’s genotype since paternal mutations
cannot be evaluated [Jorde et al., 2003]. In the case of blastomere biopsy, one or two cells
are removed from the embryo three days after fertilisation, when the embryo is composed
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of six to eight cells. A greater number of cells can be obtained for analysis through
blastocyst biopsy. This strategy entails removing ten to thirty cells from the
trophoectoderm rather than from the embryo itself. Biopsy is conducted five to six days
after fertilisation, when the blastocyst contains over one hundred cells [Simpson and
Elias, 2003; Sermon et al., 2004; Jorde et. al.].

The cells thus obtained can be analysed through various methods. Polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) is used to amplify the DNA from a single cell and diagnose monogenic
disorders such as cystic fibrosis, sickle-cell anaemia, and Duchenne muscular dystrophy.
Specific tests have been developed for approximately 40 monogenic disorders. Though
all monogenic disorders could, in theory, be detected through PCR, the cost implications
are such that tests exist only for the most common disorders [Sermon et al., 2004; Wells,
23]. Fluorescence in-situ hybridisation (FISH) analysis can be used to detect embryo sex
and chromosomal aberrations such as aneuploidy, translocations or other chromosomal
rearrangements on selected chromosomes. A new technique called comparative genomic
hybridisation (CGH) has also been developed to analyse the chromosomal complement of
embryos. While FISH can only detect a limited number of chromosomes (between five
and nine per cell), comparative genomic hybridisation enables scientists to evaluate all
chromosomes simultaneously. However, because it is a lengthy process, and because
there is only a very short period of time during which PGD can be performed, CGH is not
widely used [Sermon et al., 2004; Simpson et al., 2003; Wells, 2003]. Once cell analysis
is completed, embryos that are free from the mutations or chromosomal aberrations tested
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for are implanted into the woman’s uterus. In the case of polar body diagnosis, the
selected ova are fertilised and then implanted.

The use of PGD can improve the outcome of a pregnancy for a couple who use in vitro
fertilisation in order to conceive and for those who are at increased risk of transmitting a
genetic disorder to their offspring [Verlinsky et al., 2004]. However, it does not guarantee
the birth of a healthy child. Available data from 2001 shows that following PGD,
pregnancies were established in 16 to 24 percent of treatment cycles [European Society
of Human Reproduction and Embryology, 2002; International Working Group on
Preimplantation Genetics, 2001] and that a small percentage of the children born as a
result of these pregnancies had some form of anomaly [International Working Group on
Preimplantation Genetics, 2001]. There is a slight risk of misdiagnosis in PGD, often due
to allelic dropout (a problem associated with PCR amplification failures) or DNA
contamination. However, techniques such as multiplex-PCR and amplification of
hypervariable fragments of DNA can lower risks of misdiagnosis [Jorde et al., 2003;
Sermon et al., 2004; Wells, 2003]. Though PGD is considered a safe procedure, it
remains “costly and technically challenging” [Jorde et al., 2003].

Access to PND and PGD

Prenatal genetic testing is not universally accessible. Many factors affect a pregnant
woman’s ability to access these services, including economics and clinical risk factors.
Develop intro here
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Evidence-Based Access: Standards of Usefulness

Whether or not a woman or couple is offered prenatal testing can depend on whether the
health provider believes she meets the relevant risk threshold. Evaluating the clinical
necessity of intervention is generally considered an appropriate strategy for allocating
scarce medical resources [AMA Code of Ethics, s.E-2.03]. It is also a way to avoid
unnecessary invasive tests. Concerns have been raised about recent direct-to-consumer
marketing approaches which may cause increased demand on the part of consumers and
lead to indiscriminate offers of testing without an appropriate risk assessment [Andrews
and Zuiker, 2003; Holtzman and Watson, 1997]. On the other hand, it has recently been
argued that the evidence to support the cost utility analysis of the risk thresholds is
deficient, and that such thresholds can threaten autonomous choice; accordingly, it is
argued that all pregnant women should be offered prenatal testing regardless of risk
[Harris et al., 2004]. In any event, risk thresholds remain an important determining factor
in access to prenatal testing, and a number of organizations have issued guidelines to
assist health care professionals and geneticists in assessing the risk factors. Some risk
factors can be identified by asking the right questions, including questions about maternal
age, family history of genetic disorders, previous children, ethnic background, and
medical and obstetric history [Roop, 2000; SOGC, 1998]. Another way to screen for risk
factors is through medical examination, including maternal serum screening and
ultrasound. In practice, these various methods are often combined into an overall risk
assessment. Evidence-based standards of access arise in the initial screen stage.
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Screening cannot detect the presence of a disorder; it only identifies women who are at
increased risk of having a child with a genetic anomaly.

Practice Guidelines
Ethnicity. Certain ethic backgrounds are associated with an increased risk of genetic
disorder. For example, Tay-Sachs disease has been linked to Ashkenazi Jews and French
Canadians in Eastern Quebec; and individuals of other than northern European descent
are considered at high risk for thalassemia. It is generally recommended that genetic
screening be uniformly offered to patients with high risk ethnic backgrounds [SOGC,
1998; AMA Code of Ethics, s.E-2.137].

With respect to CF in particular, a National Institutes of Health (NIH) Consensus Panel
originally issued a statement supporting access to CF testing for all pregnant couples,
especially those in high risk populations [NIH, 1997]. Following this, a Steering
Committee representing the interests of ACOG, ACMG and NHGRI was established to
refine the recommendations, leading to creation of general guidelines [Grody et al.,
2001], laboratory standards [Richards et al., 2002], and patient education materials
[ACOG, 2001a; ACOG, 2001b]. Overall, the materials recommend offering CF testing to
couples in high risk ethnic groups who are pregnant or planning pregnancy, and making it
available along with information about its limitations to couples in other ethnic groups
with lower risk. Given that knowledge of one’s carrier status can have implications for
family planning [Lafayette et al., 1999], it is recommended that members of high risk
ethnic groups be tested for carrier status prior to conception, to allow for genetic
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counselling at an early stage [Grody et al., 2001; Chodirker et al., 2001a]. According to
Canadian guidelines, it is preferable for both partners to be tested, but knowledge that the
woman is a carrier can still be an indication for prenatal diagnosis [Chodirker et al.,
2001a].

Family History. It is widely agreed that a recurring genetic disorder in a family’s history
is “a reasonable indication of risk” [Roop, 2000; Holtzman and Watson, 1997].
According to the AMA Code of Ethics, “prenatal genetic testing is most appropriate for
women or couples whose medical histories or family backgrounds indicate an elevated
risk of fetal genetic disorders” [AMA Code of Ethics, s.E-2.12]. Physicians should
therefore take a full family history, which includes inquiries about siblings, parents,
parents’ siblings, grandparents, and other extended family members where appropriate.
However, family history does have limitations, particularly with respect to reliability and
the different modes of inheritance [Holtzman and Watson, 1997]. Canadian practice
guidelines appear to envision a spectrum, ranging from cases where prenatal testing must
be offered (for example, where the woman is a carrier for Down syndrome) to cases
where further information or consultation with the patient is required (for example, where
one relative is found to have Down syndrome) [Chodirker et al., 2001a].

Pregnancy History. Relevant pregnancy history factors include having a previous
stillborn birth or a liveborn infant with a chromosomal anomaly. Invasive prenatal testing
should always be offered in these cases because there is an increased risk of recurrence.
Even when the prior infant had a de novo anomaly (i.e. where the parents have normal
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karyotypes), prenatal testing is offered because of the potential for parental germline
mosaicism [Chodirker et al., 2001a]. Previous environmental exposure can also be
relevant [Holtzman and Watson, 1997].

Maternal Age. It is traditionally recommended that all women over the age of 35 be
offered prenatal testing, given the increased risk of fetal aneuploidy [ACOG, 2001].
However, the particular age cut-off has been described as “somewhat arbitrary,” and the
best practice may be to look at all the factors surrounding a woman’s pregnancy [Roop,
2000]. Canadian practice guidelines note that maternal age alone is a relatively poor
predictor of fetal anomaly, and it may be inappropriate to rely on it when facilities exist
for additional screening methods [Chodirker et al., 2001a]. Notably, there is a trend
towards women extending their childbearing years, which means that invasive testing
would be offered to an increasing number of women, with questionable utility, in the
absence of further risk refinement. A recent study found that there was a reduction in the
number of women electing to have invasive testing despite the rising maternal age, and
the researchers attributed this to a departure from using maternal age alone as a risk
assessment tool.

Advanced paternal age is also associated with an increased risk of genetic anomalies. A
frequently used cut-off is 40 years of age at the time of conception, but the ACMG
recognizes that risk increases linearly with age. Advanced paternal age is associated with
a wide variety of genetic disorders, many of which cannot be detected by ultrasound.
Therefore, the ACMG recommends genetic counseling be tailored to the individual needs
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of couples [ACMG, 1996].

Ultrasound Examination and Biochemical Markers (Maternal Serum Screening). Genetic
assessment is recommended when an ultrasound scan reveals major fetal anomalies.
There are also several minor fetal anomalies, or “soft signs,” that are statistically linked
to chromosomal anomalies, but there is controversy about whether these soft signs have
enough positive predictive value to warrant genetic testing. [Chodirker et al., 2001a].

The maternal age risk factor for Down syndrome can be refined through the use of
maternal serum screening for biochemical markers in the first or second trimester. The
ACMG recommends that women who screen positive for trisomy 21 or 18 be offered
genetic counselling and amniocentesis [Driscoll, 2004]. The ACMG also recommends
that women be offered maternal serum screening to identify pregnancies at risk of neural
tube defects and anencephaly. In these cases, the risk assessment is refined by factors
such as maternal weight, race, and family history, and an elevated result is an indication
for genetic counseling and additional testing [Driscoll, 2004]. There are numerous
combinations of markers, and second trimester screening through the “triple test” or
“quad screen” has been found particularly useful in detecting Down syndrome and
trisomy 18 [Javitt, 2004]. First trimester screening methods use a combination of serum
screening and ultrasound nuchal fold translucency screening. These methods have
comparable detection rates of second-trimester screens and offer the advantage of an
earlier test, but should not be offered routinely unless there is sufficient ultrasound
training and quality control [Driscoll, 2004; Dolan, 2004]. Recent studies have found that
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“fully integrated screening,” which combines first and second trimester screening
methods with risk assessment from maternal age, outperforms second trimester screening
alone [Dolan, 2004]. The extent to which these methods are routinely offered will depend
on many policy issues. While they offer a superior risk assessment than maternal age
alone, there is a concern that some women may rely too heavily on the screen result at the
expense of seeking a further diagnostic test. It is also relevant to consider whether a
woman who screens positive will be able to access first-trimester diagnostic testing
[Javitt, 2004].

Other Medical Factors. Given the variety of genetic disorders that can be detected
prenatally, there are other indications of risk that go beyond the scope of this chapter.
Health care providers should consult the guidelines and other medical literature for
further information. For example, the ACMG has released a number of guidelines with
respect to specific disorders, such as Fragile-X [Maddalena et al., 2001], uniparental
disomy [Shaffer at al., 2001], and Prader-Willi and Angelman syndromes [ASHG and
ACMG, 1996]. There are also clinical practice guidelines for specific testing techniques,
such as FISH [Watson et al., 2000].

Obligations of the Health Care Provider
The clinical guidelines are significant for healthcare providers because they provide a
baseline standard of care for offering access to prenatal testing services. Physicians are
under both a legal and ethical obligation to ensure that patients have access to necessary
or beneficial services. It is therefore necessary for healthcare providers to be aware of the
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clinical indications, to identify them in patients, and to discuss the potential implications
with the patient. Under ethical guidelines, physicians are required to discuss prenatal
testing with “all women who have appropriate indications” [SOGC, 1998]. The AMA
Code of Ethics also notes that women or couples who do not meet the risk threshold may
request prenatal diagnosis as long as they are aware of the risks involved [AMA Code of
Ethics, s.E-2.12]. However, physicians are not obligated to perform the service if they
lack the skills or knowledge or have a conscientious objection, as long as they engage in
discussion with the patient or offer a referral. Where a physicians feels that he or she
lacks the necessary skills or competence to perform a genetic test, it is appropriate to
offer referral elsewhere, such as to a clinical laboratory [Grody et al., 2001]. Where a
physician has a conscientious objection to genetic testing or abortion, physicians must at
least alert the parents of a potential problem, presumably using the risk factors as
guidelines, so that the parents may seek genetic counseling elsewhere [AMA Code of
Ethics, s.E-2.12]. Canadian guidelines also explicitly recognize the duty to offer referral
to an alternative provider when the opportunity for a full and frank discussion is
constrained. “Failure to discuss all options with women at risk or, alternatively, to refer
them further, is unethical” [SOGC, 1998].

In conjunction with the ethical duty to make testing available, the courts have recognized
that there is a legal duty to offer tests from which patients might benefit [Andrews and
Zuiker, 2003]. The above-noted clinical utility guidelines have come up in some cases.
For example, a physician may be liable for failure to warn of increased risks due to
advanced maternal age [Becker v. Schwartz, 1978], failure to sufficiently take into
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account ethnic background as a risk factor [Naccash v. Burger, 1982], failure to diagnose
a condition in a previous child that would have provided genetic information relevant to a
second child [Schroeder v. Perkel, 1981], and failure to offer testing when there is a
known family history [Philips v. U.S., 1981] or a previous child born with a genetic
disorder [Keel v. Banach, 1993]. Claims in the context of prenatal testing normally arise
under “wrongful birth” and “wrongful life” litigation, discussed in detail below, so the
outcome of such cases will depend on the particular facts of each case and the extent to
which it fits within the framework of these causes of action. The threat of legal action can
have a significant impact on the physician-patient relationship. Physicians who practice
in states that recognize wrongful life and wrongful birth actions are more likely to offer
prenatal testing [Roop, 2000]. The threat of malpractice litigation is a daunting prospect
for many health care providers, who may feel the need to practice defensive medicine
[Mavroforou et al., 2003]. At the same time, it is important to note that case law should
not be relied upon as the source for best practice standards, because “case law is
primarily reactive.” It only “speaks to the minimum standard of professional behaviour”
and it is likely that the public and medical community will expect an even higher
standard in practice [Botkin, 2003].

There remains a question about whether the obligation to offer a test will depend on its
predictive validity. The majority of cases have dealt with single-gene conditions and
highly predictive tests, and it may be that a different standard will apply for more
complex genetic conditions and tests of lower predictive validity [Andrews and Zuiker,
2003; Simmons v. W. Covina Medical Clinic, 1989]. Such an approach may be
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shortsighted, given that many patients will value the knowledge obtained from such tests,
and will want to hold healthcare professionals accountable for not providing such
information [Andrews and Zuiker, 2003].

Public Policy Concerns

Recent advances in prenatal diagnosis and assisted reproductive technology [ART] have
given rise to a number of ethically challenging cases with respect to access rights. While
healthcare providers can refer to a general standard of care where guidelines exist as to
clinical risk measurement, there is confusion and debate about the appropriateness of
offering testing in other cases. Some countries offer specific guidelines on access, but
others, including the U.S., have few laws governing ethically complex cases. Instead, it is
often left to clinical judgment [Stern et al., 2003; Adams, 2003].

Sex Selection
The issue of whether parents ought to be able to use genetic testing to select their fetus on
the basis of sex is controversial, and can depend on ethical, cultural and religious
perspectives. Sex selection can occur through one of three methods: 1) prenatal diagnosis
of fetal sex, followed by termination of pregnancy if it is the undesired sex; 2)
preimplantation sex diagnosis followed by selection of an embryo of the desired sex; or
3) prefertilization techniques such as sperm separation. However, the latter option is of
relative recent development, and its reliability and safety have not yet been proven
[Morales et al., 2004].
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The primary medical indication for sex selection is to identify fetuses or embryos that
may be afflicted with a sex-linked disorder. While the termination of a fetus continues to
raise ethical concerns, the use of PGD to prevent transmission of a serious sex-linked
disorder is widely considered ethically permissible [ASRM Ethics Committee, 1999;
Morales et al., 2004; Csaba and Papp, 2003]. Sex determination may be the only reliable
method of identifying sex-linked disorders [Morales et al., 2004].

More ethically problematic cases are those in which prospective parents request sex
selection for personal or cultural reasons, such as preferring a child of a certain sex or
desiring a sex-balanced family. These motivations raise a host of concerns, including
gender bias and discrimination, allocation of scarce medical resources, risk of
psychological harm to children, and overall impact on the human sex ratio [ASRM Ethics
Committee, 1999]. Sex selection for family balancing purposes is often distinguished
from an inherent sex preference. The latter is a particular concern in societies and
cultures that have historically shown a preference for male over female children, such as
China and India, where screening techniques, abortion, and infanticide have contributed
to an imbalanced sex population. While there is no such evidence of sex-preference in
North America [Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993;
Steinbock, 2002], there remains a concern that allowing sex selection of the first child
will reinforce negative attitudes and contribute to sex-discrimination [Morales et al.,
2004]. With respect to family balancing, some have suggested that it is justified as long
as one or more children are already born, since this would not involve an inherent
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favouring of one sex over another [Robertson, 2003]. Appropriate standards are difficult
to tease out in this area, for ethical doctrines can be invoked on both sides of the
argument. For example, it is argued that modern human rights demand that women not be
compelled to maintain pregnancies against their will. On the other hand, human rights are
also invoked as the basis for prohibiting sex selection, which is held to violate the right to
non-discrimination on the basis of sex [Cook et al., 2001].

Sex selection for non-medical reasons is not officially regulated in the United States, but
it is prohibited in other countries. For example, in March 2004, the Canadian federal
government enacted Bill C-6, which provides that:
5. (1) No person shall knowingly [. . .]
(e) for the purpose of creating a human being, perform any procedure or
provide, prescribe or administer any thing that would ensure or increase the
probability that an embryo will be of a particular sex, or that would identify
the sex of an in vitro embryo, except to prevent, diagnose or treat a sexlinked disorder or disease.
Contravention of this provision carries serious penalties including the possibility of
imprisonment. Unfortunately, the provision is not as clear as it could be, and leaves
loopholes for non-medical sex-selection during prenatal fetal diagnosis.

While it unmistakably prohibits sex-selection for non-medical purposes at the in vitro
embryo stage, it leaves loopholes for non-medical sex-selection during prenatal
diagnosis. For one thing, the provision refers only to embryos, which are defined under
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the statute as organisms during the first eight weeks of pregnancy. It appears that
screening the fetus after eight weeks for the purposes of sex-selection is not expressly
prohibited. There is also no mention of what happens when sex is determined incidentally
(for example, during ultrasound for another purpose). Is the doctor either permitted or
obligated to disclose this information to the patient?

In the U.S., the Ethics Committee of the ASRM released a policy statement discouraging
the use of PGD for non-medical reasons, given concerns about the burdens and costs it
imposes [ASRM Ethics Committee, 1999]. The AMA Code of Ethics also censures
“selection on the basis of non-disease related characteristics” [AMA Code of Ethics, s.E2.12]. Several world organizations also discourage sex selection for non-medical reasons
[Council of Europe, 1996; World Health Organization, 1999; International Bioethics
Committee of UNESCO, 2003]. Nonetheless, these guidelines are not enforceable as law,
and there is evidence that a number of clinics are advertising and offering IVF services
for the purpose of sex selection.

The emergence of preconception selection techniques, which do not involve discarding
embryos or fetuses, has added a new dimension to the ethical debate. The Ethics
Committee of the ASRM and others have noted that if pre-fertilization techniques were
found to be safe and reliable, it may be ethical to use them for family balancing purposes
[ASRM Ethics Committee, 2001; Robertson, 2001].
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The sex of a fetus may be determined incidentally to another procedure, such as fetal
karyotyping, and a parent may or may not wish to be informed of the sex. As will be
discussed below, women have the right to refuse information, just as they have the right
to receive it. Therefore, for both legal and ethical reasons, it is best to ask patients in
advance whether they want the sex to be disclosed, and to allow them to opt not to know
the sex of an embryo or fetus [Mavroforou et al., 2003; FIGO, 1991]. Conversely, the
ACOG Committee on Ethics recommends that this information not be withheld from a
pregnant woman who requests it, given that she has a right to her own medical
information [Morales et al., 2004]. If a physician is uncomfortable with the possibility of
indirectly contributing to sex selection, he or she ought to clarify the patient’s goals in
advance, and explicitly inform patients of any procedures they are not willing to perform
[Morales et al., 2004].

Testing for Susceptibility and Late-Onset Conditions
A further ethical concern is the use of PGD to test for genes that increase one’s
susceptibility to disease, such as cancer, or late-onset conditions, including Huntington’s
disease and Alzheimer’s disease. The two situations are somewhat different: late-onset
conditions have full penetrance and are generally not preventable, while susceptibility
genes do not have full penetrance and may be amenable to treatment. However, it has
been argued that the ethical issues are similar in each case, given the substantial, nontrivial burden imposed by the diseases, which may serve to justify testing [Sermon et al.,
2004; Robertson, 2003]. The discomfort with susceptibility testing relates to the use of
PGD to summarily discard embryos that are only associated with an increased risk, not
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certainty, of disease [Genetics and Public Policy Center, 2004]. Concerns about adultonset testing include the fact that a child could enjoy years of healthy life, and that a
treatment or cure may yet be found [Genetics and Public Policy Center, 2004]. Late-onset
testing also has an additional “ethical twist” in that the prospective parent will themselves
be a carrier of the disease because the genes are dominant. The shortened life span of the
parent is a concern because the child may lose the parent while still dependent on them
[Robertson, 2003; Towner and Loewy, 2002]. However, this may still be an ethically
justifiable procedure, given that people with disability have no less interest in
reproduction than others, and that denying services in this case could create a slippery
slope to other restrictions [Robertson, 2003].

The tests are currently legal in the U.S., subject only to gene patent restrictions
[Robertson, 2003], but this does not mean that practitioners are obligated to provide the
service. According to Botkin, the adult onset risk is not sufficient to warrant this type of
testing as a standard of care [Botkin, 2003]. Some ethical committees feel that it is too
early to offer a clear opinion on the acceptability of these tests, but an ESHRE Ethics
Task Force noted that PGD for adult onset conditions is acceptable, in spite of limited
knowledge about potential therapy in the time gap before onset [Shenfield et al., 2003]. A
UNESCO committee has suggested that susceptibility testing should be given a low
priority and restricted to cases of high risk of severe disease [International Bioethics
Committee of UNESCO, 2003]. The NSGC has urged caution in the use of adult-onset
testing. Genetic counseling is essential, and must include discussion of psychological and
social risks and benefits, including the potential for future discrimination and the
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possibility of disclosing carrier status of other family members. Parents ought to consider
whether the decision to test should be reserved for their offspring to make upon reaching
adulthood [NSGC Position Statement, 1995].

Selecting for Disability
A difficult issue arises when a woman or couple, who themselves possess a disability or a
unique characteristic, wish to have a child with that same characteristic. For example,
some deaf couples have expressed a desire to use prenatal testing or PGD to select a child
with deafness. For them, deafness is not considered a disability, but rather a defining
feature of their cultural identity. Similar cases could arise, including dwarves wishing to
select a dwarf child, or people with an intellectual disability wishing to select a child with
the same disability [Savulescu, 2002].

A deaf lesbian couple attracted much criticism in the U.S. when they attempted to have a
deaf child by intentionally using a deaf sperm donor [Savulescu, 2002]. One argument
repeatedly raised is that it was a selfish action on the part of the parents. It is argued that
intentionally selecting for deafness is not in the best interests of the child, because it
restricts the child’s future options and thereby threatens her autonomy [Davis, 1997].
Even a member of the National Association of the Deaf had trouble understanding the
couple’s decision because deaf people “don’t have as many choices” [Spriggs, 2002].

On behalf of the parents, it has been argued that deaf people can be considered a minority
group who merely suffer disadvantage as a result of societal discrimination, not of
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deafness itself. “In this sense, deafness is strictly analogous to blackness” [Levy, 2002].
Second, it is questioned whether a child selected for deafness actually suffers harm as a
result. She is not worse off than she would have been—as might be the case if the parents
had refused to allow treatment for a correctable condition—because the alternative is that
she would never have been born; a different child would have been selected instead.
Third, there is an argument based on freedom of choice. Although some members of
society may view deafness, or dwarfism, or intellectual disability in negative terms, these
value judgments should not be imposed on the couple making the reproductive decision.
This argument reminds one of the terrors of the Nazi eugenic programme, during which
couples deemed “unfit” to create the perfect child were forced to undergo sterilization
[Savulescu, 2002]. Indeed, parental choices will influence most of the important aspects
of a child’s life—from education, to religion, to social interaction—which in turn form
the basis for the child’s freedom. It is difficult to draw the line between those parental
decisions which are the preconditions for the child’s freedom of choice, and those which
foreclose too many options for the child [Levy, 2002].

Few ethical guidelines have been established in this area. UNESCO’s International
Bioethics Committee rejects the use of PGD to purposely select a child with a genetic
disease, and it includes deafness and dwarfism in its definition of disease. This practice is
held to be “unethical because it does not take into account the many lifelong and
irreversible damages that will burden the future person” [International Bioethics
Committee of UNESCO, 2003]
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Potential Stigmatization of Persons with Disabilities
It is important to recognize that for some, the very practice of PND is problematic and
raises challenging ethical issues. This means that healthcare providers and patients can
face conflicting messages about the value and acceptability of these tests. The disability
rights movement has provided a strong critique of prenatal genetic testing, drawing
heavily on concerns about its eugenic implications. Parens and Asch provide a useful
summary of the main arguments. First, it is argued that prenatal testing and selective
abortion are against public policy because such practices can lead to stigmatization of
individuals living with disability. In particular, there is a worry that the aim of genetic
testing is “to eradicate disability and reduce the number of births of genetically disabled
individuals” [DeVaro, 1998]. This is said to be harmful in the message it sends about the
worth of a life with disability and for ignoring the rich life experiences and useful
contributions that disabled individuals can bring to society. In response, proponents of
prenatal testing object that the purpose of the procedure is not to eradicate disability, but
rather to increase the reproductive autonomy of women. Also, prenatal testing does not
necessarily entail termination of the fetus; it can provide other useful information and
allow for interventions [Chen and Schiffman, 2000; Mahowald, 2003]. However, in
practice there is clearly a tension between the goals of enhancing reproductive choice and
preventing disability, particularly given evidence that the success of some genetic
screening programs is measured in terms of reduction in disability [Parens and Asch,
2003; Beaudet, 1990], and that some women perceive pressure from the social system
and health professionals to undergo testing and to terminate for disability [Fox, 2002;
Mahowald, 2003]. Second, there is a concern that the “selective mentality” of prenatal
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testing, in which parents strive for perfection and lament over disability, fosters a morally
deficient view of parenthood [Parens and Asch, 2003]. On the other hand, a distinction
can be drawn between parental motivations during prenatal testing of a “potential child”
and parental care for a disabled newborn [Mahowald, 2003]. Third, disability rights
advocates argue that genetic testing is based on a misunderstanding about what life is like
for individuals living with disability. While it is true that some families experience stress
and disruption, on average the needs of families with and without disability can be
“strikingly similar” [Parens and Asch, 2003].

Some suggest that the practice of selective abortion for disability can be criticized on
similar grounds as sex selection. Wolbring notes, for example, that both practices raise
concerns about “significant threats to the well-being of children, the children’s sense of
self-worth, and the attitude of unconditional acceptance of a new child by parents.”
Moreover, concerns about stereotypes, discrimination and oppression of persons of the
unwanted sex can apply equally to stereotypes, discrimination and oppression of
individuals with the unwanted disability [Wolbring, 2003; Wong, 2002]. According to
Wolbring, the only way to justify disability deselection, while at the same time
prohibiting sex-selection, is by “arbitrarily” labeling disabilities and diseases as medical
problems, thereby applying a different moral standard to them. He suggests that this
approach is buttressed by the marginalization of people with disabilities and the
corresponding exclusion of disability rights critiques from the bioethics discourse
[Wolbring, 2003]. It is therefore important to take seriously the disability rights critique
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so as to prevent a purely medical model of genetic testing from standing in for a rightsoriented model.

Where Do We Draw the Line?
Parens and Asch set up a working group to compare and contrast the disability rights
critique and the advocacy of prenatal genetic testing and to offer recommendations.
Although the group reached consensus on a number of issues, they reached an impasse at
the critical question: “is there a helpful and rational way to distinguish between tests that
providers should routinely offer and those they should not?” According to the group, it
comes down to whether a test is judged reasonable or unreasonable under the
circumstances, and such line-drawing can be an impossible task [Parens and Asch, 2003;
International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO, 2003]. It is highly dependent on
individual ethical judgment [Garel et al., 2002]. However, many members of society
would value some kind of line-drawing, whether for ethical reasons [Henn, 2000] or to
limit malpractice liability among the medical profession [Botkin, 2003]. Disability groups
also fear that a lack of guidelines will encourage more testing, and potentially greater
intolerance of disability [Parens and Asch, 2003; Wasserman, 2003]. Accordingly, there
have been some attempts to draw workable lines between tests or conditions [Murray,
1996; Strong, 1997; Botkin, 2003; Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 1993]. For
example, Botkin draws a line between childhood conditions that have significantly
adverse effects on the parents (“in terms of heartache, worry, time, effort, and money”)
and those that do not. Taking a cue from tort law, he suggests that the magnitude of the
potential challenge in raising the disabled child can be one criterion for offering prenatal
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diagnostic testing [Botkin, 2003]. However, the definition of precisely what constitutes a
serious parental challenge, and any other potential considerations, will need to be fleshed
out with further ethical guidelines.

Abortion Law

A discussion of prenatal diagnosis would not be complete without a discussion of the
legal framework governing access to abortion. Until 1988, abortion was regulated as a
criminal act in Canada. The Criminal Code established a set of rules pursuant to which
women could have limited access to therapeutic abortions in Canada. It provided that an
abortion could only be performed by a qualified physician in a hospital accredited by the
provincial government. In addition, a therapeutic abortion committee had to certify that
continuing the pregnancy would or would likely endanger the patient’s life or health. The
committee was to be composed of three additional physicians from the hospital in which
the procedure was to be performed. Abortions that did not meet these criteria carried the
possibility of life imprisonment for the physician and 2 years’ imprisonment for the
female patient [s. 251].

However, in 1988, following a constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court of Canada
struck down section 251 of the Criminal Code, stating that it violated the right to security
of the person as guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms because of
the procedural defects its application entailed. One Supreme Court judge also concluded
that s. 251 violated women’s freedom of conscience and religion, as well as their right to

28
liberty [R. v. Morgentaler, 1988]. The Court did not conclude that abortion could not be
criminalised nor that women had a positive right to access abortion services; these issues
remained open. In 1990, the federal government attempted to pass a bill that would have
re-criminalised abortion, but this effort was defeated in the Senate in 1991 [Bill C-43].
Subsequent federal governments have not attempted to legislate abortion since then.
Consequently, abortion is not a crime in Canada if it is performed by a qualified medical
practitioner, with the consent of the woman undergoing the procedure [Rodgers, 2002].

This does not mean, however, that abortion is completely unregulated. On the contrary, it
is regulated in the same complex manner as all other medical procedures and therefore
subject to provincial and territorial laws governing health care professionals, hospitals
and access to health care services [Rodgers, 2002; Farid, 1997]. The provinces and
territories have adopted different approaches to the issue of abortion, leading to unequal
access to these services across Canada.

For example, the funding of abortion services varies among provinces and territories.
Provincial health insurance plans in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and
Newfoundland and Labrador cover the full cost of abortions performed in both hospitals
and clinics. Those in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island
and the territories fund only abortions performed in hospitals. Québec and Nova Scotia
provide full funding for abortions performed in hospitals, but partial funding only for
those performed in clinics [Childbirth by Choice, 2003].
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While some provinces such as British Columbia and Ontario have taken steps to protect
women’s right to access abortion services without undue interference [Access to
Abortion services Act; R. v. Lewis; Ontario (A.G.) v. Dieleman], in other jurisdictions
legislatures have limited access by imposing funding criteria such as the requirement to
obtain certification by a committee of physicians that the abortion is necessary because
the health of the woman and/or foetus is at risk [Health Services Payment Regulation;
Morgentaler v. Prince Edward Island (Minister of Health and Social Services), 1995;
Moulton, 2003].

Access to abortion services is also hampered by the lack of availability of services. In
2003, only 17.8 percent of hospitals in Canada were providing abortion services
[Canadian Abortion Rights Action League, 2003]. Abortion clinics provide services to a
significant number of women, but they are not found in every province or in the
territories. Abortion services, whether in hospitals or clinics, are concentrated in large
urban centres, leaving many regions under-serviced. In addition, abortions are not
performed at all in Prince Edward Island or in Nunavut [Childbirth by Choice, 2003]. In
many jurisdictions, this lack of services results in long waiting lists and compels women
to travel to another region or province to obtain an abortion [Childbirth by Choice, 2003].
This may constitute a significant barrier to access given the costs of travel as well as the
delay involved.

This has serious implications for couples who wish to terminate a pregnancy after the
prenatal diagnosis of a genetic disorder. Moreover, in many regions of Canada, abortions
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are performed only up to 12 or 16 weeks’ gestation. Though some hospitals do perform
abortions after 20 weeks in cases of severe disability or risk to the woman’s life or health,
these are limited in number [Childbirth by Choice, 2003]. The delay required to conduct
prenatal testing and obtain results combined with the waiting list for abortion services
may significantly limit the woman’s or couple’s choices.

Since the landmark case of Roe v. Wade, women in the United States have a
constitutional right to abortion. In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that
the right to privacy included the right to decide to have an abortion. However, this latter
right was not absolute; it could be limited by a compelling state interest. The Court went
on to devise a rule aiming to balance a woman’s right to privacy with the state’s interest
in protecting her health and its interest in the potentiality of human life. The result was a
rule based on a recognition of increasing state interest as the pregnancy progressed.
During the first trimester of pregnancy, the woman’s right to privacy was prevalent and
the decision to abort was left to the medical judgement of the woman and her physician.
After the end of the first trimester, the state could regulate abortion “to the extent that the
regulation reasonably relate[d] to the preservation and protection of maternal health.”
Finally, after the fetus became viable, the state could limit and even proscribe abortion,
except where it was necessary to protect the life or health of the mother [Roe v. Wade,
1973].

The Roe v. Wade decision did not settle the abortion issue in the United States. On the
contrary, it opened up a highly polarized debate. States began passing laws restricting
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access to abortion through a variety of means, including the restriction of funding, the
imposing of counseling and waiting periods, the requirement of parental consent for
minors and the prohibition of certain procedures [Green & Ecker, 2004; Hull & Hoffer,
2001; Peterson, 1996; Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003; Alan Guttmacher Institute,
2004b]. Some of these laws have been successfully challenged, though many have been
upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court has somewhat eroded the Roe decision through
its subsequent rulings, but its central finding - that a woman has a right to choose
abortion before the fetus becomes viable - still holds [Peterson, 1996]. States are
therefore free to prohibit all late-term or post-viability abortions, except where the
woman’s life or health is in danger. Nineteen states have adopted such statutes and
seventeen others have adopted statutes that do not meet the Supreme Court’s criteria
because they permit abortion only where there is a threat to the life of the woman or
because they prohibit abortion after a specific gestational age [Alan Guttmacher Institute,
2004a]. The problem in the context of prenatal genetic diagnosis is that almost all these
states do not recognize an exception in cases of fetal anomaly. Because of the gestational
age at which genetic tests can be safely and effectively conducted and the time required
to obtain results, some women may be placed in a situation where their state laws prohibit
them from choosing to terminate their pregnancy. This situation may become
increasingly common as technology enables the medical profession to push the fetal
viability limit earlier in the gestation period.

A number of additional barriers limit women’s access to abortion in the United States
[Henshaw & Finer, 2003]. The first of these is financial: many states do not provide any
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public funding for abortions [Peterson, 1996]. Women or couples who do not have
private health insurance therefore have to pay for the procedure themselves. Secondly,
the number of physicians who provide abortion services is limited. The violence of some
elements of the anti-abortion movement in the 1990s and the lack of training in medical
schools has had a significant impact on the shortage of providers. In many regions,
women may have to travel more than 50 or 100 miles to find a physician or a clinic [Finer
& Heanshaw, 2003; Henshaw & Finer, 2003; Joffe, 2003; Peterson, 1996; Dresser, 1994].
This, compounded with legal barriers such as the obligation imposed on physicians to
provide counseling and to require patients to wait 24 hours before the procedure, or
alternatively, to evaluate fetal viability, creates a substantial burden for patients who
already are in a difficult situation [Henshaw & Finer, 2003].

Informed Consent and Genetic Counseling

As discussed in Chapter ___, health care professionals have both a legal and ethical
duty to ensure informed consent before providing treatment. In the context of PND and
PGD, informed consent recognizes a woman’s right to reproductive autonomy, which
means both that women have the freedom to choose whether to procreate or not procreate
[Strong, 2003], and that they have the right to refuse medically indicated testing [Morales
et al., 2004]. Reproductive autonomy is promoted when women or couples are provided
information relevant to decisions about whether to continue the pregnancy [Strong,
2003]. The duty demands a full disclosure of information to the patient, including
available tests, alternatives, risks and benefits, and outcomes.
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Ethical guidelines recognize the importance of ensuring informed consent to prenatal
testing [ACOG Code of Ethics, s.I(5); NSGC Position Statement, 1991; NSGC Code of
Ethics, s.II(3); AMA Code of Ethics, s.E-2.12]. For example, the ACOG Code of Ethics
requires obstetrician-gynecologists to disclose all relevant medical facts, including
“alternative modes of treatment and the objectives, risks, benefits, possible
complications, and anticipated results of such treatment” [ACOG Code of Ethics, s.I(5)].
The ACOG also recognizes that informed consent implies not only provision of
information, but also free choice and active decision-making on the part of the patient; it
is “not only a ‘permitting’ but a ‘doing’” [Morales et al., 2004]. Where patients are
referred to a clinical laboratory, the responsibility for obtaining informed consent remains
with the health professional, though laboratories may be required to document the
consent depending on jurisdiction. In turn, laboratories must provide sufficient
information to doctors to facilitate the informed consent process [Bradley et al., 2004;
Richards et al., 2002; Holtzman and Watson, 1997].

Courts have also noted the importance of providing information relevant to reproductive
decisions. As one court noted, “society has a vested interest in reducing and preventing
birth defects,” and the failure to perform a procedure “which would have yielded
information material to the parents’ decision whether to abort the fetus, constitutes a
breach of . . . duty” [Blake v. Cruz, 1984]. Therefore, healthcare providers are under an
obligation to provide information, and can face legal liability for failure to enter a full
discussion with the patient. Indeed it has been noted that most medical malpractice suits
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are based on inadequate communication between healthcare provider and patient, rather
than error [Mavroforou et al., 2003]. In the context of prenatal care, the legal duty to
provide information has been well-established in “wrongful birth” cases, in which the
parents allege that the physician’s negligence deprived them of the opportunity to make a
reproductive choice regarding conception or termination.

New and difficult questions about informed consent arise in the context of PND and
PGD. Prenatal diagnosis is an evolving and complex procedure, characterized by
“inevitable ambiguity, uncertainty, and difficult decision making,” and involving many
ethical dilemmas, social implications, and grave potential for diagnostic errors that are
not seen in other kinds of medical intervention [Strauss, 2002]. Perhaps the most unique
aspect of genetic testing is that the desirability of treatment depends highly upon moral
and ethical judgments; in other words, “there is no single “right” answer for all women
and couples, only answers that are right for the individual woman or couples, based on
personal circumstances and values” [Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies, 1993]. Respect for an individual or couple’s values and beliefs is of
“paramount importance” [Holtzman and Watson, 1997]. This may give rise to unique
legal and ethical models of informed consent. For example, while Canadian courts
typically rely on what a “reasonable” patient or physician would decide, it has been
argued that a “genetics model of informed consent” has evolved which is more about
incorporating the decision-maker’s (i.e. the patient’s) personal values into the process of
decision-making [Sharpe, 1997].

The recognition of differing value judgments forms the basis of the principle of non-
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directiveness, which is central to genetic counseling. According to this principle, the role
of the health professional is:
. . . not to lead clients to make particular decisions or choices (those
preferred or recommended by the clinician, the health service or by
society) but to help them to make the best decisions for themselves and
their families as judged from their own perspectives [Clark, 1997].
The AMA Code of Ethics notes that counselors should not substitute their own personal
values and moral judgment for that of the prospective parent [AMA Code of Ethics, s.E2.12]. It must be remembered that not all women are the same, and that a woman and her
physician may have radically different perceptions of risk and burden [Csaba and Papp,
2003]. The counselor or physician should therefore ascertain the patient’s personal values
and expectations and use them as the framework for the decision-making process. Several
reasons for the emphasis on non-directiveness have been identified, including: respect for
individual autonomy; a desire to disassociate current genetic practices from the history of
eugenics; prevention of over-involvement by health care providers; and protecting
professionals from legal action for medical decisions [Williams et al., 2002]. However, as
will be discussed below, there are questions about whether non-directive counseling is
possible, or even desirable, in practice.

Barriers to Informed Consent in the PND Context

Before delving into the requirements for informed consent, it is important to examine the
unique barriers to informed consent that arise in the context of prenatal diagnosis. Several

36
studies have unfortunately revealed that many women are not given the tools to exercise
an informed choice [Marteau and Dormandy, 2001; Kohut et al., 2002], which no doubt
reflects the extent to which health care providers and patients are struggling to grapple
with some of these barriers. First, this area of medicine is highly complex, involving a
variety of different screens and tests and a multitude of detectable anomalies. The general
public may lack knowledge of the intricate science of genetics [Lanie et al., 2004]. Also,
given that prenatal testing involves probabilities instead of certainties, patients can feel
frustrated by the ambiguity and vagueness of the genetic predictions when attempting to
make an informed decision [Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies,
1993]. Discussions of prenatal diagnosis will be unique from other types of medical
discussions because many prospective parents will have no first-hand knowledge of the
disorders being diagnosed. They will therefore be “almost entirely dependent on their
counselors for information about disabilities and may have difficulty imagining the
various possibilities and options” [Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies, 1993]. There is also a danger that health professionals themselves may
lack sufficient knowledge, especially as services are increasingly performed by primary
care physicians or obstetricians, rather than geneticists [Ormond et al., 2003; Marteau and
Dormandy, 2001; Abramsky et al., 2001; Holtzman and Watson, 1997]. Furthermore, the
rapid increase in technology means that an increasing amount of information is available
for disclosure. This raises concerns about the detrimental impact of information overload
on a patient’s ability to understand the process and to make an informed choice.

A second barrier to informed consent is the significant time constraints imposed by the

37
PND context. Not only does the woman or couple face time pressures while trying to
process information, but the health care provider may also lack the time to present
information adequately [Marteau and Dormandy, 2001; Holtzman and Watson, 1997].
These time pressures become increasingly important when the woman wishes to consider
abortion, because the longer an abortion is delayed, the more risks and trauma it involves
for the woman [Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993].

Informed Consent for PND: What to Include in the Discussion

It is essential to remember that prenatal tests are only offered to women and couples.
They are not mandatory, and the choice to undergo testing remains with the woman
[Kohut et al., 2002]. It is therefore essential that as much information as possible be
discussed prior to testing, not merely after a diagnosis has been made. It may also be
prudent to discuss the genetic counseling service itself, including issues such as
confidentiality and nonpaternity, given that many patients will be unfamiliar with the
service [Jacobson et al., 2001]. Several elements have been repeatedly identified as
central to a well-informed decision with respect to PND.

I. Information about the Procedures
Under Canadian law, courts tend to impose a very high standard of disclosure for services
that affect reproductive capacity because they are generally not life or death situations
[Sneiderman et al., 2003]. Ethical guidelines similarly demand a very comprehensive
disclosure of information. The necessary information includes: available methods of
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prenatal diagnosis; the difference between screening (e.g. ultrasound) and diagnostic
testing (e.g. amniocentesis); risks and benefits of various techniques, including the risk of
pregnancy loss; the timing of the procedures; details of the conditions for which
procedures screen or test; frequency of abnormal results; accuracy of results, including
the implications of false positives and false negatives in screening; the frequency of need
for repeat testing; the possibility that abnormalities may go undetected; and, for relatively
new and untested procedures, a detailed explanation of their uncertainty and experimental
nature [SOGC, 1998; Chodirker at al., 2001b]. Overall, there has been a trend towards
providing an increasing amount of detailed information, and it has been suggested that
this is unlikely to reverse in the future [Mavroforou et al., 2003].

The method of presentation of such complex information can have a significant impact
on the patient’s reaction and interpretation. Describing every possible risk and
consequence in alarming detail can distort the patient’s comprehension and impair the
informed consent process.
It is possible to be frank, honest, and direct without being either grim or
frightening. It is possible to discuss risk and still leave hope. Pessimism
may decrease the effectiveness of the communication and lead to
increased patient anxiety [Kelly, 1992].

It is unclear whether physicians are under a duty to provide information about procedures
that appear unavailable to the woman. It has been suggested that physicians may now be
obliged to inform patients of the inadequacies of the health-care system and of the

39
availability of better diagnostic or treatment options elsewhere in Canada or in the United
States [Osborne, 2003]. Certainly, if the procedure is unavailable due to lack of hospital
resources, then the patient should be informed if it is accessible elsewhere. But if the
procedure is unavailable because the cost is too prohibitive or because it is only available
in distant countries, “it is not obvious that physicians are legally bound to tantalize” the
woman with options beyond her reach [Dickens, 2002]. There is also authority from the
U.S. for the argument that physicians are not obligated to inform of procedures available
in other jurisdictions when such procedures are illegal in the state in question [Spencer v.
??]. There may also be no duty to disclose treatment that is not generally recommended
[Munro v. Regent of the University of California, 1989] The physician may want to cater
the information to options that are within patients’ reasonable access. On the other hand,
one may want to risk erring on the side of over-informing rather than under-informing
because the couple may be willing to make sacrifices the doctor does not consider
reasonable or possible [Cook et al., 2001], and doctors may face liability for failing to
inform of alternatives that the patient would have considered.

The distinction between prenatal screening and diagnostic testing is a particularly
important piece of information that must not be neglected. The increasing “routinization”
of ultrasound screening means that it is occurring with greater regularity than diagnostic
testing and is more likely to be performed by a general practitioner or obstetrician than a
genetic specialist [Suter, 2002]. Unfortunately, studies have documented the poor levels
of information conveyed by non-genetic specialists at early stages of pregnancy
[Bernhardt et al., 1998; Marteau et al., 1992]. It is essential that women be given the

40
opportunity to opt out, without detriment to their further prenatal care [Mavroforou et al.,
2003]. Particular attention must be paid to the woman’s potential lack of information
about these screening procedures. First, many women are not aware of the full extent of
genetic information that can be revealed, and some are not even aware that ultrasound
can detect fetal abnormalities at all [Kohut et al., 2002]. Women must be properly
informed of this possibility because some may elect not to have the procedure for this
reason, or they could at least be better prepared to hear the results. If the woman is not
properly informed, and a genetic problem is detected, there is a question about whether
this should be disclosed. This is a difficult ethical issue, and the best recommendation is
that patients be warned of such possibilities prior to testing so that they can express their
wishes with respect to disclosure [Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1996]. Second,
patients must be fully informed about the limitations of the screening procedure (the fact
that not all anomalies can be detected), and about the risks and benefits involved
[Driscoll, 2004; SOGC, 1999; Kohut et al., 2002]. Third, while diagnostic testing can
detect the presence of a disability, screening only identifies at-risk individuals. Patients
should be informed that a screening test is not a replacement for a diagnostic test, and
that detection of a fetal abnormality through screening may necessitate a more invasive
diagnostic test [Driscoll, 2004]. Otherwise, women who would not choose diagnostic
testing will end up facing a very difficult decision after receiving an abnormal screening
result. If they reject the further diagnostic test, “the rest of the pregnancy will be fraught
with tension, anxiety and worry.” This unnecessary anxiety could have been avoided by
refusing the initial screening test [Suter, 2002]. Fourth, it is important to clarify the
distinction between probabilities revealed through screening (including the risks of false
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positives) and confirmatory diagnoses. To enhance understanding of the numbers,
evidence shows that quantifying uncertainty in frequencies rather than probabilities, and
presenting risks in words rather than numbers is most helpful [Marteau and Dormandy,
2001]. Finally, even women who fully understand this information may face increased
anxiety upon a false positive screening result, feeling that “something must be wrong,”
and it is recommended that this risk of anxiety be discussed [Suter, 2002].

II. Information about the Genetic Conditions
It is essential to provide women information not only about the available procedures, but
also about the conditions that can be detected through testing. First, many patients may
not have sufficient understanding of basic genetics, and it is important to clear up
misconceptions (e.g. heredity, genetic terminology) [Lanie et al., 2004]. Second, it is
important to be as comprehensive as possible about the types of conditions that may be
detected to enable an informed choice about whether they want the information disclosed.
It must be remembered that although women are entitled to receive information, this does
not mean they are under a duty to do so; in other words, they have the “right not to
know.” This is significant in the genetic context because a genetic diagnosis may reveal
unwelcome information [Dickens, 2002]. Providing fetal information to a parent who did
not request it may cause a number of harms, including forcing the couple to make
difficult choices about continuing the pregnancy, changing the parents’ attitude towards
the pregnancy and the “abnormal” child, and affecting others in the family by revealing
genetic information about their own health [Boyle et al., 2003]. As one woman recently
stated, “Knowing is not always best” [Kohut et al., 2002]. It is therefore essential to
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inform patients about the various anomalies that a procedure may detect, to give them an
opportunity to a) accept or reject the procedure as a whole, and b) choose which
information they would like disclosed to them should anything be detected [Boyle et al.,
2003; FIGO, 1991]. Physicians should also be cautious about attributing a woman’s
reluctance to discuss fetal anomalies to an informed choice not to know. The reluctance
may simply stem from a fear of the unknown, and physicians should attempt to allay this
fear [Kohut et al., 2002]. Unfortunately, the breadth of information available means that
some information will be conveyed more often than others. For example, it has been
found that women are informed less often about the possibility of detecting a SCA, than
the possibility of autosomal trisomies, leading to fear and confusion when SCAs are
detected [Petrucelli et al., 1998].

Providing information about conditions is a difficult balancing act. On the one
hand, respect for a patient’s autonomy demands that counselors convey as much
information as is practical to convey, but on the other hand too much information
might be confusing or overwhelming for the patient. Because genetic information
is framed in language of probabilities and statistics, practitioners must be
especially careful not to be misleading and to communicate at a level appropriate
to the patient.

III. Range of Options Available upon Finding an Abnormal Result
Couples must be informed of the full range of management options available when
confronted with an abnormal result. These options include termination of the affected
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pregnancy or continuing with the pregnancy while preparing for the birth of the child.
[Chodirker et al., 2001b; Strong, 2003]. Studies have shown that information on the first
option is given more often than information on the second option, but even that is not
always provided [Marteau and Dormandy, 2001].

With respect to abortion, the woman must be informed of the various abortion procedures
and their availability, including the time frame during which abortion is legally available,
its availability in the local area, and the nearest facilities where it can be obtained
[Strong, 2003; Chodirker et al., 2001b]. If a physician has a conscientious objection to
abortion, or lacks the necessary resources to perform abortions, this does not justify
failing to inform the patient of the option or failing to offer a referral [Strong, 2003;
Dickens, 2002; CMA Code of Ethics, AMA Code of Ethics s.E-2.12; FIGO, 1995].

Although abortion is to be discussed as an option, women must be advised beforehand
that an agreement to terminate a pregnancy if an abnormality is found is not a
precondition for testing [Chodirker et al., 2001b; SOGC, 1998; FIGO, 1991]. In other
words, “the link between prenatal diagnosis of fetal anomaly and termination of
pregnancy is potential only” [Bennett, 2001]. This is important because studies show that
a decision to undergo prenatal testing is not always linked to the intention to terminate
pregnancy [Lafayette et al., 1999]. On the other hand, prenatal testing may not be
valuable for all women would who not consider an abortion. Counselors should help
women avoid the “potentially ‘toxic’ knowledge” of a fetal anomaly by encouraging
them to consider whether abortion is a viable option and what prenatal diagnosis would

44
mean to them [Suter, 2002].

IV: Social Aspects of Disability and Raising a Disabled Child: Stigma, Prejudice,
Access to Resources
It is also important to discuss social issues related to disability, including the long-term
implications of living with a disease, the prognosis for the disease, and the expected
quality of the child’s life [Brookes, 2001; Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies, 1993]. It can also be helpful to describe what the child might look like
[Petrucelli et al., 1998]. Unfortunately, health care providers are educated too rarely on
the implications of life with disability, and may have difficulty conveying such
information [Parens and Asch, 2003]. Different healthcare professionals may also assess
quality of life in different ways. There is evidence that most health care trainees focus on
medical aspects of quality of life, instead of personal and social variables. Genetic
counselling students are more likely than other medical students to prioritize the personal
and social factors in discussions of quality of life [Ormond et al., 2003]. The perceived
seriousness of disability and the negative social predictions can also vary depending on
the person [Marteau and Dormandy, 2001]. This may stem from lack of knowledge and
experience in dealing with disability. One mother noted that, “without her experience of
caring for a child with a genetic condition, the negative picture presented by her medical
practitioners in a later pregnancy would have undermined her confidence in her ability to
care” [Brookes, 2001]. It is therefore important for health care professionals to receive
education and training in order to present an accurate picture of disability. This will
necessarily involve sensitivity training and consultation with a variety of groups to
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achieve a balanced picture of life with disability [Ormond et al., 2003; Marteau and
Dormandy, 2001; Parens and Asch, 2003].

Parens and Asch note that there is some uncertainty about the ideal moment to engage in
this discussion. Prior to the screening test, it may be impractical to convey that much
information; after a positive screen, parents may be in shock and may feel threatened by
such a discussion. Parents might be most willing to gather information after a positive
diagnosis, while on the other hand it may be too stressful to process new information at
that point. One clear guideline is that if a woman or couple requests information, they
should receive it [Parens and Asch, 2003].

V. Social Pressures to Make the “Right” Decision
Informed choice is threatened by various social pressures that influence a woman or
couple’s decision in the context of prenatal testing. The very existence of PND makes it
possible to view the birth of a disabled child as a woman or couple’s “choice,” thereby
making the woman or couple accountable in the event of discriminatory reactions
towards the child and themselves [Brookes, 2001]. Social pressures stem not only from
direct stigmatization, but also from the lack of economic or social resources for those
living with disabilities. It has been recommended that anyone undergoing genetic
counseling should be fully informed about the social pressures they may experience, “so
that they have an opportunity to consider how such pressures might affect them” [Royal
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993].
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At the same time, however, such pressures can originate in the medical community itself.
In contrast with the principle of non-directiveness, studies have found that mothers
experience a need to “push against” both overt and covert pressure to undergo invasive
PND [Brookes, 2001], and that some are left with the impression that they were not
actually given a choice [Kohut et al., 2002]. These pressures are of particular danger
when procedures such as ultrasound are offered in a routine “matter of fact” manner.
Thus, women ought to be explicitly informed that they have the right to refuse or accept
any aspect of the offer [Kohut et al., 2002].

Emotional and Psychosocial Counseling as Part of the Informed Consent Process

Another unique aspect of PND relative to other medical services is that it is not
concerned with treatment and cure, but rather with probabilities and predictions. Given
the highly unsatisfactory nature of such information, the anxiety it may cause, and the
potential for grave errors, an important aspect of prenatal care in the context of PND is
the provision of emotional support. This is based on the ethical principle of beneficence,
which requires physicians to reasonably attempt to prevent and remove health-related
harms to their patients. When the woman requires help, including emotional support, and
the health professional is in a position to offer it, the professional is under a duty to do so
[Strong, 2003]. It has been suggested that this type of emotional and psychological
counseling imposes upon genetic testing a distinct model of care, based upon a
therapeutic “human vision” rather than a mere “medical vision” [Sharpe, 1997]. Not only
can emotional distress threaten the patient’s well-being, but it can significantly impair his
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or her ability to comprehend the information. There may be a duty to assess and respond
to the patient’s emotional and psychological needs to ensure that the communication
process is not impaired [Sharpe, 1994b; 1996].

Pre- and Post-Test Counselling
Before the patient even chooses to undergo testing, counsellors may have a duty to
inform her of the risk of anxiety subsequent to the test [Suter, 2002]. After testing, it is
the responsibility of the health care provider who initiates referral to ensure that, when
test results are received, they are reviewed and reported to the woman as quickly as
possible [SOGC, 1998]. Because the initial shock of receiving a positive diagnosis may
cause “psychological devastation,” physicians must respond to the psychological and
emotional concerns of the parents, inform them of the potential for mistaken diagnosis,
and inform them of the full range of options available [SOGC, 1999]. Although many
physicians receive little or no training in giving “bad news” and feel uncomfortable doing
so, there is a growing body of literature that can be consulted regarding effective
techniques for delivering “bad news” in these situations [Strong, 2003].

Follow-Up Counseling
Following the diagnosis of a severe disorder, or the decision to terminate a pregnancy,
the woman or couple may require additional long-term supportive counseling. Follow up
calls and letters can be a valuable source of support [Petrucelli et al., 1998]. Women may
feel a strong sense of guilt following an abortion [Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies, 1993], and it also marks the beginning of a grieving process
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for many women [Bennett, 2001; Dallaire and Lortie, 1993]. It is recommended that
“special attention” be given to the counseling needs of women and couples in cases
involving termination after the discovery of a serious fetal disorder [Royal Commission
on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993]. For example, a session should be scheduled
to counsel the patient concerning future pregnancies and to assess her emotional needs.
Moreover, the woman and her partner may grieve in different ways, creating a sense of
isolation from each other, and referral for couple’s counseling may be appropriate
[Strong, 2003]. Finally, access or referral to self-help groups or associations of people
who have had a child with the same disorder may help reduce the feeling of isolation and
provide support and helpful advice [Royal Commission, 1993; Dallaire and Lortie, 1993;
Petrucelli et al., 1998].

Structuring the Genetic Counselling Session

The setting of the genetic counseling session plays an important role in the informed
consent process. First, women and couples must be given sufficient time to consider the
relative advantages and disadvantages of various procedures [Mavroforou et al., 2003].
Canadian guidelines recommend counseling appointments be scheduled at least one day
prior to invasive procedures [Chodirker et al., 2001b]. Second, face-to-face encounters
may be the best way to communicate information because they allow the counselor to see
and respond to the patient’s emotional reactions, to gauge her level of understanding
based on body language, and to provide helpful visual aids. The physical setting must be
conducive to a discussion; namely, private and relatively quiet [Strong, 2003]. However,
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some studies indicate no large difference between telephone and in person counseling
with respect to patient understanding and anxiety. Indeed, visual privacy of the telephone
may be beneficial for open communication [Sangha et al., 2003]. In any event, telephone
discussions can be an important adjunct for women who are geographically distant
[Chodirker et al., 2001b; Sangha et al., 2003]. Third, as discussed in Chapter ___,
written brochures or videos should be made available [Holtzman and Watson, 1997], but
should not be relied on as the sole means of transmitting information. Concerns have
been raised about the quality of these brochures, and whether they may be too complex,
technical, or difficult to read [Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies,
1993; Marteau and Dormandy, 2001]. Canadian guidelines note that if provided, they
must be regularly reviewed and updated [SOGC, 1998]. Written summaries of the
counseling sessions can also be helpful for the patient [Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies, 1993], although it has been found that counselors are
unlikely to use informed consent documents [Jacobson et al., 2001].

Informed Consent and Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD)

While genetic counseling for PND has been studied in detail, little has been written about
the recommended course of action for couples considering PGD, presumably because it is
relatively new and uncommon procedure [Raeburn, 2001]. In this case, the consultation
requires discussion of two topics: in vitro fertilization (IVF) and PGD. There must be a
realistic assessment of pregnancy success, side effects and potential risks. It is also
important to explain that in PGD only a limited number of diseases are tested for,
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meaning that the baby is not guaranteed to be “perfect” [Overton et al., 2001]. It has also
been suggested that couples be informed of the differing misdiagnosis rates depending on
the implantation method, and that they should decide the degree of misdiagnosis that is
acceptable. The discussion must also cover the welfare of future children and the needs of
the family [Raeburn, 2001]. Couples should also receive psychological counseling,
involving exploration of their reasons for choosing PGD and their overall feelings.
Couples who choose PGD may already have suffered stresses, such as an affected child,
repeated miscarriage, previous prenatal diagnosis, or termination [Overton et al., 2001].
Finally, the professionals involved at the referring genetic centre and the clinical team
from the IVF centre should keep in close contact with one another [Raeburn, 2001].

Final Thoughts: Can Genetic Counselling be Non-Directive?

Although non-directiveness in genetic counselling has come to be seen as a “universal
norm,” doubts have been raised about how achievable, how desirable, and how accurate
the principle is in practice [Bower et al., 2002; Anderson, 1999]. A recent survey of
genetic counsellors revealed some of their main concerns. First, the nondirective
approach can be confusing for women because they are used to the typical settings in
which the health practitioner offers an opinion. Second, some patients are actually
seeking direction from practitioners when making important health decisions, to relieve
the responsibility from themselves. Third, some women might value the views of others
as an information-gathering tool, to test different opinions. Fourth, attempting to give
scientific facts and medical knowledge in a value-neutral way is incompatible with the
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notion of a caring relationship, and can undermine open communication. The survey
highlighted that counsellors did not adopt a uniform strategy for discussions, and much
depended on how they framed the information and what information they opted to
disclose [Williams et al., 2002].

Aside from the practitioner’s behaviour, the general move towards routine prenatal
testing has an impact on the directiveness of counselling. Both the strong value our
society places on knowledge, information, and technology, and the increasingly
routinized way in which prenatal testing is offered places informed “choice” at risk. In
particular, these factors deemphasize the emotional and psychological ramifications of
undergoing such testing [Suter, 2002]. Furthermore, genetic counseling and genetic
procedures (especially prenatal screening) are now performed by a variety of individuals
other than genetic counselors, such as obstetricians and midwives. These non-genetic
health professionals are less “steeped” in the culture of nondirectiveness and may not
understand that genetic testing imposes a unique standard of care for communication
[Suter, 2002; Williams et al., 2002; Sharpe, 1994A; 1996]. Evidence does show that the
counselling provided by geneticists tends to be more positive and less directive than that
provided by other health professionals [Marteau and Dormandy, 2001].

Confidentiality

Health care professionals have a legal and ethical duty to protect the confidentiality of
personal health information they receive from or about their patients [AMA Code of
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Medical Ethics; CMA Code of Ethics; Feinberg, Peters & Willson, 1984; Picard &
Robertson, 1996; Marshall & Von Tigerstrom, 2003]. What does this entail for health
care professionals who provide prenatal testing and preimplantation genetic diagnosis
services? As a general rule, the wishes of patients to keep their information confidential
should be respected. Couples or women who choose to undergo prenatal testing or
preimplantation diagnosis may wish to keep this a secret. They may feel that their health
risks and the risks to their potential children concern only themselves. Alternatively, they
may worry that their choice to undergo such tests, to consider a termination of pregnancy
or the elimination of embryos, or to voluntarily have a child who will be disabled could
be considered morally questionable by others. Parents may also want to keep the results
of these tests, and the information it reveals about them, to themselves for a number of
reasons, for example for fear of stigmatization and discrimination or because of feelings
of guilt. One parent may also oppose the disclosure of prenatal test results to the other
parent because he or she believes it is in the other’s best interest or because he or she
fears abandonment. If a child is born with a genetic disorder, parents may prefer to give
an alternative explanation for the child’s disability.

Nonetheless, this information could be relevant for a number of third parties, including
relatives of the couple and, in particular, those who are of reproductive age or younger
(siblings, cousins, nephews and nieces, etc.). Because genetic information is individual
and familial, a test result indicating that a foetus carries a genetic mutation or
chromosomal aberration could indicate that blood relatives are at increased risk of having
a genetic disorder themselves or of having a child with a disorder. The refusal of a patient
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to share that information creates a dilemma for the healthcare professional; his or her
duty to protect the patient’s confidentiality collides with his or her duty to prevent harm
[Lucassen & Parker, 2004; Offit et al., 2004]. Various organisations have developed
policies and guidelines to assist healthcare professionals to resolve these issues. The
American Society of Human Genetics adopted the position that genetic information
“should be protected by the legal and ethical principle of confidentiality” but that
disclosure should be permitted in exceptional circumstances, namely when (1) attempts
have been made to encourage a patient to disclose the information but have failed; (2) it
is highly likely that the non-disclosure of information will lead to a serious and
foreseeable harm; (3) the at-risk relatives are identifiable; (4) the harm is preventable or
treatable or medically acceptable standards indicate that early monitoring will reduce the
genetic risk; and (5) the harm that may result from the failure to disclose outweighs the
harm that may result from disclosure [American Society of Human Genetics, 1998].
Though these criteria are broad, they do provide much needed guidance to healthcare
professionals who are confronted with these issues. However, healthcare professionals
should be aware that though a disclosure may be considered ethically justifiable, it may
not be legally justifiable. In some settings, the non-consensual disclosure of a patient’s
personal information may be authorised only if it is required by law.
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